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What	will	a	COVID-19	public	inquiry	look	like	and	what
might	it	conclude?
Nick	Dickinson	draws	on	previous	inquiries	to	discuss	what	a	public	one	into	the	COVID-19
crisis	may	look	like.	He	concludes	that	while	an	inquiry	into	the	government’s	response	may	be
necessary	for	evaluating	what	went	right	and	what	went	wrong,	an	inquiry	should	nonetheless	not
be	seen	as	inevitable	nor	the	most	useful	way	to	provide	accountability.
In	the	last	few	weeks,	several	articles	about	the	UK’s	pandemic	response	have	led	to	speculation
about	an	eventual	public	inquiry	into	the	crisis.	Most	notably,	the	Sunday	Times’	Insight
investigation	was	framed	significantly	around	the	idea	that	the	events	of	recent	months	will	eventually	become	the
subject	of	an	inquiry.	Indeed,	from	relatively	early	on	in	the	crisis,	some	had	already	concluded	that	such	a	review
was	inevitable	and	that	its	findings	will	presumably	be	damning.	But	why	are	the	hypothetical	conclusions	of	a
future	investigation	so	important	to	the	current	debate?	And	what	might	an	inquiry	actually	say	about	the
government	response	when	it	eventually	reports?
Public	inquiries	have	been	called	‘Britain’s	favoured	mechanism	for	ascertaining	the	facts	after	any	major
breakdown	or	controversy’.	First	established	on	a	legislative	basis	in	1921,	and	now	regulated	under	the	Inquiries
Act	2005,	public	inquiries	have	a	deceptively	simple	purpose	to	provide	a	means,	independent	of	the	government,
to	answer	three	questions.	What	happened?	Why	did	it	happen	and	who	is	to	blame?	What	can	be	done	to	prevent
this	happening	again?
While	being	far	from	the	only	means	to	do	so,	they	have	been	deployed	increasingly	frequently	in	recent	years.	In
2017,	an	Institute	for	Government	study	identified	68	public	inquiries	between	1990	and	2017,	compared	with	a
mere	19	in	the	previous	30	years.	Based	on	this	record,	and	the	small	but	fascinating	literature	on	the	topic,	what
can	we	conclude	about	what	a	COVID	inquiry	will	look	like?	And	what	might	it	ultimately	conclude?
A	public	inquiry	into	COVID-19	is	not	as	inevitable	as	you	think.
The	establishment	of	an	inquiry	may	often	seem	inevitable,	but	not	all	major	incidents	are	subject	to	one.	In	1988,
the	Lockerbie	disaster	killed	270	people	abord	Pan	American	Flight	103	yet	no	inquiry	was	appointed.	There	was
also	no	independent	public	inquiry	into	the	banking	crisis	in	2008,	with	the	task	instead	handled	by	the	Commons
Treasury	Committee.	According	to	one	study,	of	664	events	which	led	to	calls	for	an	inquiry	in	the	twenty	year
period	to	2003,	only	44	(6.6	%)	resulted	in	an	inquiry.
Ultimately,	this	is	because	while	inquiries	play	a	critical	role	in	getting	to	the	facts,	the	choice	to	establish	one	in	the
end	lies	with	ministers.	As	such,	the	probability	of	an	inquiry	has	been	shown	to	be	the	result	of	a	complex	blame
avoidance	and	strategic	calculation	on	the	part	of	ministers,	who	will	establish	an	inquiry	only	when	the	costs	of	not
doing	so	outweigh	the	risks	of	acknowledging	failings.
An	inquiry	would	culminate	a	trend	towards	‘risk’	focused	inquiries.
While	inquiries	do	not	always	follow	major	incidents,	an	inquiry	into	the	COVID-19	crisis	would	follow	the	pattern	of
inquiries	not	focused	on	a	particular	government	decision	but	on	the	competency	with	which	a	specific	risk	was
managed.	As	Adam	Burgess	notes,	“the	subject	and	focus	of	inquiries	have	tended	to	shift	from	matters	internal	to
the	state	to	more	public	concerns.	Specifically,	social	risk	in	the	sense	of	pervasive	yet	diffuse	uncertainty	and
threat,	often	focused	around	rare	but	high-profile	incidents.”
Unlike	early	inquiries	like	the	Marconi	inquiry,	or	more	recent	investigations	like	those	on	Iraq,	a	COVID-19	inquiry
would	seek	to	establish	if	the	government	did	enough	to	protect	people	from	a	risk	it	played	no	part	in	causing.	This
role	for	public	inquiries	has	been	crucial	in	creating	an	environment	in	which	the	unnecessary	suffering	of	ordinary
people	becomes	a	serious	matter	of	state.	At	the	same	time,	it	may	impose	unreasonable	expectations	on	what
government	can	do.
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As	some	of	the	reporting	has	shown,	a	key	failing	of	pandemic	planning	may	have	been	resignation	to	a	scale	of
suffering	which	proved	politically	unsustainable	in	practice.	A	COVID-19	inquiry	thus	may	well	trigger	a	broader
reassessment	of	assumptions	about	what	hazards	government	is	responsible	for	preventing.
There	may	well	be	more	than	one.
Attempts	to	assess	government	policy	often	lead	to	multiple	non-cumulative	evaluation,	in	which	learning	from
mistakes	is	inhibited	by	contradictory	conclusions.	This	problem	has	often	affected	UK	public	inquiries.	The	Saville
Inquiry	into	Bloody	Sunday	was	faced	with	the	toxic	legacy	of	the	previous	Widgery	review,	widely	viewed	as	a
whitewash.	Likewise,	the	Chilcott	Inquiry	into	the	Iraq	war	faced	some	public	scepticism	and	fatigue	as	a	result	of
two	previous	inquiries	which	had	come	to	alternate	conclusions	about	the	handling	of	intelligence	in	the	runup	to
war.
A	rushed	or	botched	COVID-19	investigation	could	ultimately	lead	to	reports	which	muddy	the	water	and	leave
conclusions	either	permanently	open	to	challenge	or,	just	as	serious,	arrived	at	years	too	late	for	recommendations
to	be	implemented	in	time	for	future	pandemic	events.
The	choice	of	chair	and	terms	of	reference	will	be	highly	contested.
The	choice	of	the	chair	and	terms	of	reference	for	an	inquiry	will	be	both	crucially	important	and	a	moment	of	acute
danger	for	any	inquiry.	This	choice	lies	with	ministers.	However,	increasingly	appointments	and	terms	of	reference
have	been	developed	in	consultation	with	representatives	of	affected	groups.	This	has	obvious	benefits	of	securing
buy-in	from	victims.	Yet	the	dangers	of	this	approach	have	also	been	seen	in	the	case	of	the	Independent	Inquiry
into	Child	Sex	Abuse,	which	has	cycled	through	four	chairs,	with	a	series	of	revisions	to	its	scope	and	terms	of
reference.
This	dynamic,	whereby	the	inquiry	itself	is	drawn	into	the	scandal	afflicting	the	part	of	the	state	it	is	seeking	to
investigate,	is	a	key	risk	for	a	COVID-19	inquiry.	The	last	review	of	a	UK	government	response	to	a	pandemic,	the
2009	H1N1	‘Swine	flu’	outbreak	(though	not	a	public	inquiry)	had	two	bullet	points	for	terms	of	reference	and
interviewed	around	100	actors	mainly	from	within	government.	An	inquiry	into	COVID-19	will	be	nothing	like	this,
requiring	a	process	and	a	chair	capable	of	engaging	with	the	vast	array	of	victims	this	crisis	is	creating	daily.
It	may	centre	more	on	conflicts	between	the	regulatory	and	political	state,	rather	than	the	actions	of
particular	politicians.
While	much	of	the	reporting	has	focused	on	the	political	battles	and	actions	of	the	Prime	Minister,	an	inquiry	will
inevitably	focus	more	on	the	institutional	conflicts	between	and	within	the	‘regulatory	state’,	or	the	complex	webs	of
accountability	which	constitute	the	modern	British	state.	Since	the	Health	and	Social	Care	Act	2012,	operational
control	of	the	health	service	in	England	has	largely	been	transferred	to	a	non-departmental	public	body,	NHS
England,	and	an	executive	agency,	Public	Health	England.	Likewise,	government	scientific	advice	is	structured
through	an	‘alphabet	soup’	of	committees	with	varying	responsibilities.
Even	where	senior	politicians	are	called	to	give	oral	evidence	on	failings,	the	results	are	unlikely	to	be	satisfying.	A
study	of	the	2009	Irish	Banking	Inquiry	showed	that	financiers	avoided	providing	direct	apologies,	opting	instead
only	for	general	expressions	of	regret	that	the	crisis	had	occurred.	The	chances	for	such	a	cathartic	moment	over
COVID-19	are	thus	slim.
A	useful	Tool,	but	not	a	panacea
In	sum,	a	public	inquiry	into	the	government’s	pandemic	response	may	well	be	a	warranted	and	necessary	part	of
the	process	of	evaluating	what	went	wrong	in	the	greatest	public	health	crisis	in	a	century.	But	we	should	not	see	an
inquiry	as	necessarily	either	the	inevitable	conclusion	or	the	most	useful	way	to	provide	accountability	and	learn	the
lessons	of	COVID-19.
____________________
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